New zero-knowledge proofs are given for some number-theoretic problems. All of the problems are in NP, but the proofs given here are much more e cient than the previously known proofs. In addition, these proofs do not require the prover to be super-polynomial in power. A probabilistic polynomial time prover with the appropriate trap-door knowledge is su cient. The proofs are perfect or statistical zero-knowledge in all cases except one.
Introduction
Many researchers have studied zero-knowledge proofs and the classes of problems which have such zero-knowledge proofs. Little attention, however, has been paid to the practicality of these proofs. It is known, for example, that, under certain cryptographic assumptions, all problems in NP have zero-knowledge proofs 19], 8], 10]. Although these proofs can be performed with probabilistic polynomial time provers who have the appropriate trapdoor information, these proofs may involve a transformation to a circuit or to an NP-complete problem, so they are often quite ine cient. The rst zero-knowledge proofs, those for quadratic residuosity and non-residuosity 22], were practical; they were e cient and the prover could be probabilistic polynomial time if she 1 had the appropriate trap-door knowledge. Other e cient zero-knowledge proofs are given in 9], 11], 12], 15], 23], 30] .
In this paper we present a practical zero-knowledge proof for a special case of primitivity. This protocol, which shows that an element of the multiplicative group modulo a prime is a generator, only requires that the prover be probabilistic polynomial time, though she must know the complete factorization of p?1. Note that the protocol given in 30] is not practical because the prover must be able to compute discrete logarithms. In order to avoid that problem in our protocol, we have the veri er give the prover \hints" which will help her nd the discrete logarithms in question. Unfortunately, the portion of our protocol which shows that the element a is a primitive element of Z p fails in some cases if p ? 1 has large square factors. It fails, though, in such a well-de ned manner that we can use its failure in a zero-knowledge proof that a number n is
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1 not square-free. This proof that a number is not square-free is zero-knowledge only under a certain reasonable intractability assumption and is thus only computational zero-knowledge rather than perfect or statistical zero-knowledge. The protocol does not, however, involve any bit encryptions (blobs). All previous \natural" zero-knowledge proofs which are neither perfect nor statistical zero-knowledge have used bit encryptions. Furthermore, this zeroknowledge proof is e cient, assuming the Extended Riemann Hypothesis.
We also give practical zero-knowledge proofs for non-primitivity, and for membership and non-membership in fnj n and '(n) are relatively primeg. None of these proofs require that the prover be more than probabilistic polynomial time.
De nitions
This section contains de nitions for interactive proofs and zero-knowledge 22].
De nition 1 An interactive proof system for a language L is a protocol for two probabilistic interactive Turing machines, the prover and the veri er. They have a common tape with the input string x. Both machines have private work tapes and private auxiliary input tapes, and there are two tapes on which they can communicate with each other. In polynomial time the veri er stops and either accepts or rejects the input string. The protocol has the following properties:
completeness: If x 2 L and both the prover and the veri er are following the protocol, then for every c > 0, Pr(veri er accepts x) 1 ? jxj ?c , for jxj su ciently large.
soundness: If x 6 2 L and the veri er is following the protocol then for every program run by the prover and for every c > 0, Pr(veri er rejects x) 1 ? jxj ?c , for jxj su ciently large.
De nition 2 An interactive proof system for a language L is prover-practical if the prover runs in probabilistic polynomial time. The prover's private auxiliary input tape is assumed to initially contain some trapdoor information about the input.
If P and V are the programs of the two interactive machines, then the interactive proof system is denoted by (P; V ).
In the de nition, the completeness property means that using the protocol the prover can convince the veri er of x 2 L with large probability. On the other hand, because of the soundness property, if x 6 2 L, the prover cannot convince the veri er of the contrary. The de nition says that the probability that a cheating prover is successful should be less than 1=f(jx)j for any polynomial f. However, the protocols we present here follow the standard practice of only allowing an exponentially small probability of successful cheating. In our paper we are interested in the case in which the running time of P is also polynomial in the length of the input, i.e. in prover-practical interactive proof systems. At the beginning of the protocol P has some additional information, \secret knowledge about the input", on her private auxiliary input tape. With this she can convince the veri er in polynomial time, that the input belongs to the language L.
De nition 3 A transcript of a conversation between machines V and P consists of the input string, the random bits of V , and the messages sent by the two parties.
In the following de nitions, we are using Oren's notation 25]. The veri er may have some auxiliary input y on his private auxiliary input tape. In his de nitions of zeroknowledge, Oren takes into account the e ect that this auxiliary input has on the communication between the two parties. When these de nitions are used, as opposed to the original de nitions, the concatenation of two zero-knowledge protocols is still a zero-knowledge protocol.
Let < P(x); V (x; y) > denote the probability distribution of transcripts generated by P and V on x 2 L, when y is initially on V 's private auxiliary input tape.
Intuitively, it is clear that if a machine M V , which is no more powerful than the veri er, can produce transcripts which have a very similar distribution to < P(x); V (x; y) >, then V will learn very little (other than that x 2 L) which it could not have computed on its own. In order to formalize this idea of very similar transcripts, Goldwasser, Micali and Racko 22] consider probabilistic polynomial time distinguishers, which output 0 on some transcripts and 1 on others. If no distinguisher D can e ectively di erentiate between two distributions, they are considered similar.
De nition 4 An interactive proof system is zero-knowledge for the language L if, for every Note that M V (x; y) denotes the distribution of transcripts generated by M V , given x and y as inputs.
M V , the simulator, depends on the veri er's program V . For example, the simulator can use the veri er itself, run the veri er's program for awhile, and occasionally back up the veri er's program to a certain point. Thus, we can think of the simulator as asking questions of the veri er (when it writes something on a communication tape and runs the program for the veri er to get a response), or as revealing information to the veri er (when it is responding to a challenge which the veri er's program has written on a communication tape). The simulator's output is a transcript.
In this general de nition, the simulator's output is only polynomially indistinguishable from the original transcripts. The de nitions below apply to certain cases in which it is possible to prove that the simulator's output is actually very similar to, rather than just polynomially indistinguishable from, the original transcripts. If the simulator's output has a distribution which is statistically very close to that of the original transcripts, we have statistical zero-knowledge; and if the distributions are identical, we have perfect zeroknowledge. We say that the protocol is computational zero-knowledge if it is zero-knowledge, but is not perfect or even statistical zero-knowledge.
De nition 5 An interactive proof system for the language L is perfect zero-knowledge if, for every probabilistic polynomial time machine V , there exists an expected polynomial time algorithm M V , such that 8x 2 L : 8y :< P(x); V (x; y) > = M V (x; y): 3 De nition 6 An interactive proof system for language L is statistical zero-knowledge if, for every probabilistic polynomial time machine V , there exists an expected polynomial time algorithm M V , such that for any subset T of transcripts: 8c In practice, most statistical zero-knowledge proofs have also been perfect zero-knowledge proofs. Our imprimitivity protocol is an example of an interactive proof which is statistical, but not perfect, zero-knowledge.
It has been shown that if there exist any one-way functions, then every NP-language has a zero-knowledge proof system 19]. On the other hand it is unlikely that there are perfect zero-knowledge proof systems for all problems with zero-knowledge proofs. The results of 17] and 7] show that NP-complete languages do not have perfect zero-knowledge proof systems unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to the second level, which would be a major surprising result in complexity theory.
Zero-knowledge interactive proofs can be very useful in designing cryptographic protocols. If the subroutines in a cryptographic protocol are zero-knowledge, then they leak no information whatsoever, so it is easier to prove the entire protocol correct and secure. The tools which have been most useful in cryptography have been number theoretic, so we are concentrating on proofs for number theoretic problems.
Some of our proofs only work on a well-de ned subset of the possible inputs, so these problems can be viewed as promise problems 14] 18]. From 14] we get the notation that a promise problem (Q; R) is deciding if the input x belongs to R given that we know that x belongs to Q.
The de nitions of zero-knowledge proofs do not require that the prover be a probabilistic polynomial time machine; hence zero-knowledge proofs may not be practical. None of our protocols require more than a probabilistic polynomial time prover. Thus, they are proverpractical zero-knowledge proofs. In addition, none of our proofs involve a transformation to a circuit or an NP-complete problem. Usually such a transformation would involve a signi cant blowup in the size of the problem, greatly increasing the number of bits which must be communicated. For example, the circuit for proving that the element g is a primitive element of Z p would presumably involve checking that a factorization of p ? 1 is complete and checking for each prime factor q of p ? 1, that g raised to the power (p ? 1)=q is not the identity. This circuit is not at all trivial; the protocol we give involves much less communication.
We will denote the number of bits communicated on inputs of size N, to achieve an error probability of no more than 2 ?N , by CC(N).
Showing that a protocol is a prover-practical zero-knowledge proof can be slightly more complicated than just showing that it is a zero-knowledge proof. When proving the completeness of the protocol, it is necessary to show that the prover can actually perform all of the required computations. This is, of course, unnecessary when no limits are placed on the prover's computational power. 4 3 The Zero-Knowledge Proofs 3.1 Primitivity.
If we are allowing the prover to be all-powerful, it is easy to give a zero-knowledge proof that g is a generator of the multiplicative group modulo a prime p. In one such proof, the following would be repeated k = dlog 2 pe times: Protocol 1
1. The veri er randomly and uniformly chooses r 2 Z p?1 .
2. The veri er computes h g r (mod p) and sends it to the prover. 3. The veri er and the prover execute Protocol 3 (see below). This will convince the prover that the veri er knows, in the sense of 15], the discrete logarithm of h. 4 . The prover takes the discrete logarithm of h to get r. 5 . The prover sends r back to the veri er who checks that it is correct. This is slightly more complicated than the zero-knowledge proof in 30], and it still has the problem that the prover needs to be able to take discrete logarithms. If instead of proving that g is a generator, we just want an interactive proof that g is a quasi-generator, then we don't need such a powerful prover. The veri er can give the prover a hint which enable her to compute the discrete logarithm. As we will see later, for many values of n, all quasi-generators will be generators.
De nition 7 Suppose p is a prime, g is a generator of Z p , and p?1 = 2 l p In other words g is a quasi-generator if and only if 1. g (p?1)=2 6 = 1 and 2. any odd prime dividing p ? 1 also divides the order of g. Let us assume that the prover initially has the complete factorization of p ? 1 on her private auxiliary input tape. In most applications, this is a reasonable assumption because it is possible in expected polynomial time to create a random prime p with a given length, along with the complete factorization of p ? 1 3] , 1]. Now, we will modify the above zero-knowledge proof to include the following steps, which should be repeated k = dlog 2 2. The veri er computes h g r (mod p) and sends it to the prover. 2 1 2 . The veri er computes x r 2 (mod p ? 1) and sends it to the prover.
3. The veri er and prover execute Protocol 3 (see below). This will convince the prover that the veri er knows, in the sense of 15], the discrete logarithm of h. 4 0 : The prover takes the discrete logarithm of h to get r and checks that x has the correct form. If something fails, the prover terminates the protocol. 5. The prover sends r back to the veri er who checks that it is correct. We will now show that the above protocol is indeed a perfect zero-knowledge proof with a probabilistic polynomial time prover.
Completeness: We will show how a probabilistic polynomial time prover can nd r given the hint x and h. The idea is that the prover will solve the problem modulo every prime power dividing p ? 1 The prover calculates r modulo every prime power dividing p ? 1 using the above procedure, and then she can calculate r using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Soundness: Let's suppose that g is not a quasi-generator. If g is a quadratic residue, the veri er rejects in step 0. Thus we may assume that g is a quadratic nonresidue. We will show that in this case the prover will fail to send back the correct r at least 50% of the time. If g is not a quasi-generator, then g = f tq l for some f 2 Z p and for some odd prime factor q of p ? 1 q l )) = f tq l r f ts(p?1) = g r . Thus there are at least two distinct square roots of x which are discrete logarithms of h, so the prover can not determine from x and h if the veri er chose r or r 0 in step 1. Now we will show that the prover learns nothing from the veri er in step 3 which could help her in determining which one of r and r 0 the veri er has chosen. Let us rst describe 6 the subprotocol used in step 3. This is the parallel version of the discrete logarithm protocol of 11] with the roles of the prover and the veri er switched. We are doing it in parallel to make it clearer that the entire primitivity protocol can be done in parallel.
The following is done in parallel for 1 i k = dlog 2 Observe that in both situations all of Vic's messages are the same, and these are the only possibilities, given that he chose either r or r 0 in step 1. Hence, this step is of no help to the prover, so she has at best a 50-50 chance of guessing whether the veri er chose r or r 0 in step 1.
Zero-Knowledge: We will sketch some of the ideas for the construction of the simulator. The ideas follow the lines of 20]. The main idea is to use the veri er (here he can be any probabilistic polynomial time machine), and his proof in step 3 that he knows r, to nd this r.
The simulator asks a question ( 1 ; : : :; k ) in step 3.3, and if it does not get a correct answer, meaning that for all i, (h i ;r i ) satis es that h i = g^r i =h i , it stops as the real prover would. If it gets a correct answer, it has to nd the real r since this is what the real prover does. To do this, it resets the veri er to the point just before the question was asked and asks another random question ( If it can not nd r this way, then the simulator continues asking random questions until it can either nd r or it has asked 2 k questions. In the second case, it computes r, using brute force. It can be shown that this simulator runs in expected polynomial time for all veri ers. Furthermore, we can make this a bounded round protocol because this simulator works even if the protocol is run in parallel. In Appendix A we give the details of this simulation. Hence we get a bounded round perfect zero-knowledge protocol: 2 Since O(k log 2 p) bits are communicated in step 3 to achieve error probability not greater then (1=2) k , the communication cost of the entire protocol is O(k
Then there is a prover-practical perfect zero-knowledge, bounded round, interactive proof system for L. Then there is a prover-practical perfect zero-knowledge, bounded round, interactive proof system for the promise problem (Q; G). The set of primes, for which this protocol can be used to \prove" that an element is a generator, is of reasonable size since 29] proved that 9c > 0 : fpj p x; p prime and p ? 1 square-freeg fpj p x and p primeg c for x su ciently large. Throughout this section, we have been looking at the multiplicative group Z p of the integers modulo a prime p. It is easy, however, to generalize the proof system given above to any other cyclic group with known order. For the proof that an element is a generator it is enough to assume, that the order of the group is square-free except for some \easy-tond" prime divisors with exponents larger than 1. (Known prime divisors can be handled as 2 is in step 0.) Consider, for example, the multiplicative group Z q of the integers modulo q = p n , where p is an odd prime and n 1. Almost all that is necessary is to substitute '(q) = p n?1 (p ? 1) in place of p ? 1 throughout this exposition. (When q is prime, '(q),
Euler's phi function, has the value q?1.) Of course, '(q) is never square-free if n > 2. This is not a problem, however, because q is easy to factor, so the veri er and the simulator can nd p and can check that g p n?2 (p?1) 6 1 (mod p n ). Thus, one can assume that g 6 h tp (mod p n ) for any integer t, and one again only needs to worry about square factors of p ? 1. Notice that this is even easier in this particular case because the problem of determining primitivity in the group Z p n is e ciently reducible to that of determining primitivity in Z p . This follows from the fact, that an element g 2 Z p n is primitive if and only if g p n?2 (p?1) 6 1( mod p n ) and g is primitive when viewed as an element of the group Z p . 8 
Are n and '(n) relatively prime?
In the zero-knowledge proof system for generators presented in the previous section, we had to assume that p ? 1 was square-free. This is unfortunate, particularly since there is no known e cient zero-knowledge proof for square-freeness. It is possible, however, to give an e cient proof that a number n and '(n), the number of elements in the multiplicative group modulo n, are relatively prime. This property implies that n is square-free. Thus, if p ? 1 = 2 l m, where m is odd, and if m and '(m) are relatively prime, the prover could prove that this is the case and afterwards she could prove primitivity. Unfortunately, it is possible to have m and '(m) not relatively prime even if p ? 1 is square-free, so this proof system will not work for quite as large a class as we would like. Combined with the proof system of the previous section, however, it gives a perfect zero-knowledge proof for f(p; g)jp is prime, p ? 1 = 2 l m, where m is odd, gcd(m; '(m)) = 1, and < g >= Z p g: Suppose the prover knows '(n) for an odd integer n and wants to prove that n and '(n) are relatively prime. The prover and veri er can repeat the following dlog 2 ne times. Protocol 4
1. The veri er randomly and uniformly chooses x 2 Z n and sends it to the prover. 2. The prover chooses a random r 2 Z n and sends the veri er y r n x (mod n). We will now show that the above is a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof system for fnj gcd(n; '(n)) = 1g. Completeness: When n and '(n) are relatively prime, x (x k ) n (mod n) where k (n (mod '(n))) ?1 (mod '(n)). Hence the prover can compute n th roots of x and y.
Soundness: Suppose that n and '(n) are not relatively prime. Then, the gcd(n; '(n)) = q, where 1 < q < '(n) < n. Since there is some positive integer t such that, for every g 2 Z n ; g n g tq (modn), every element which has n th roots also has q th roots. Exactly '(n) q elements in Z n have q th roots, so no more than half of the elements of Z n have n th roots. If the veri er chooses an x which does not have an n th root, there is no more than a 50-50 chance that the prover will be able to answer the challenge chosen by the veri er. Thus, at each step, there is at least one chance in four that the prover will be caught, making the probability that the prover will succeed dlog 2 ne times exponentially small.
Zero-Knowledge: The simulator gets x from the veri er and chooses randomly and uniformly 2 f0; 1g and r 2 Z n . If = 0, it lets y = r n x; otherwise y = r n . Observe that since x has an n th root, we have that y in both cases is drawn from the same distribution as that of the prover's y. So there is a 50-50 chance that the veri er will choose = .
In this case the simulation succeeds; otherwise the simulator backs up the veri er, chooses new random and r, and tries again. Thus the simulation is expected polynomial time, and this protocol is perfect zero-knowledge: 2 Furthermore, the protocol can be parallelized following the lines of 4], as protocol 5 below is parallelized in protocol 6, giving a bounded round, perfect zero-knowledge proof system. The above discussion gives Theorem 2 There is a prover-practical perfect zero-knowledge, bounded round, interactive proof system for fnj gcd(n; '(n)) = 1g If n and '(n) are not relatively prime, a prover who knows '(n) can give a proverpractical zero-knowledge proof that they have a common factor, under certain assumptions.
One such proof involves repeating the following dlog 2 ne times. First, the prover sends the veri er a random x 2 Z n such that x does not have an n th root. She can do this by choosing random x 2 Z n until x '(n)=gcd(n;'(n)) 6 = 1 (mod n). Then, the veri er chooses a random r 2 Z n and a random bit . The veri er then sends y r n x (modn) to the prover.
Next, using the technique due to Benaloh 5] of using cryptographic capsules, the veri er gives a zero-knowledge proof that he knows n and . Finally, the prover reveals the bit . The reason this is not perfect zero-knowledge is that the prover must originally produce an n th -nonresidue x, and it's not clear that the simulator can do this. If q = gcd(n; '(n)) is large enough (super-polynomial) though, the simulator could pick x 2 Z n at random and it's unlikely that x would be a q th -residue. In this case, the protocol would be statistical zero-knowledge.
Imprimitivity.
Suppose p is a prime and g is not a generator of Z p . In this section, we will show how, if the prover knows t < p ? 1 such that g t (mod p) 1, she can give a prover-practical interactive proof that g is not a generator. The proof is statistical zero-knowledge if p?1 t is large enough. The major advantage of the protocol given here over that in 30] is that we do not need to assume that a generator for Z p is publicly available. The set we are concerned with is S = f(p; g)j p is a prime; 9t < p ? 1; g t 1 (mod p)g:
The values p and g are available to both the prover and the veri er; the value t is initially on the prover's private auxiliary input tape; and the prover is attempting to convince the veri er that g is not a generator modulo p. Let s = p?1 t . Our proof is based on the fact that for every integer r; l, g r g r+tl (mod p), so the prover can nd many discrete logarithms for an element as long as she knows one discrete logarithm. If g was a generator, however, each element would have only one discrete logarithm in the range 1; p ? 1]. The protocol consists of dlog 2 pe independent repetitions of the following: If g is not a generator, for all h 2< g >, two such discrete logarithms will exist, and the method described for computing them is e cient.
Soundness: If g was a generator, only one discrete logarithm would exist, so for each of the veri er's challenges, the prover would have at most a 50-50 chance of being able to give a correct response.
Zero-Knowledge: Let us look at a simulator for this protocol. The simulator would choose a random r uniformly from 1; p?1]. The simulator would then run the program for the veri er with the value g r being sent from the prover. The simulator has a 50-50 chance of answering the veri er's question each time simply by revealing r. If it cannot answer, it will backtrack the veri er to the point of choosing r and try another one. The simulation is obviously expected polynomial time. Both the prover and the simulator choose h to be a random element of the subgroup generated by g. If s is even the simulator generates r 0 's with the same distribution as the prover. The interesting case is when s is odd (because otherwise g is a quadratic residue) and then the distributions of r 0 's in step 5 are somewhat di erent depending on whether you have the true prover or the simulator.
The true prover never gives r 0 in the interval p?1 ] if s is odd, but the simulator might. But since s is large, these distributions are statistically close. Let us look at one of the independent repetitions of the above protocol. Let P(x) denote the probability that the true prover reveals x in step 5, and let S(x) denote the probability that the simulator produces x in step 5. For any subset X of f1; : : :; p ? 1g; j P x2X P( ), where N = 2dlog 2 pe is the size of the input. The prover's auxiliary input tape contains t.
This restriction to subsets S f of S is unfortunate. If the prover only proves things from these smaller sets, she gives away some information, i.e. that s f(log 2 p). This does not appear to be much information since if s is small the veri er could himself have found s. But since there is a grey area between super-polynomially large and any xed polynomial, we can't nd a uniform simulator that works for all possible magnitudes for s. One solution to this problem is to consider an alternative de nition of zero-knowledge. In the GMR-de nition we have a simulator which can fool every probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher with probability greater than 1 ? 1 N c for every c for N su ciently large, where N is the input size. In our de nition, we give c to the simulator, which then runs in an expected time which is polynomial in N c . Hence the simulator is expected polynomial time for xed c. Other than allowing the simulator's running time to vary depending on c, this de nition is identical to Oren's 25], and we are using similar notation.
De nition 8 Let (P; V ) be a interactive proof system for L. Then We believe that this de nition captures the intuition of zero-knowledge. With this de nition we can easily construct a simulator for the nongenerator protocol. It behaves exactly as the old one after testing that s log c+2 p. If it nds s and hence t, it proceeds as the real prover would; otherwise it proceeds as the old simulator would. Using our new de nition we get:
Theorem 4 There is a prover-practical weak statistical zero-knowledge interactive proof system for f(p; g)jp is a prime; 9t < p ? 1; g t 1 (mod p)g With this new de nition of zero-knowledge we can also remove the assumption, in the protocol in 30] for the same problem, that one generator is publicly known. We can let the prover give the veri er a random generator. This is prover-practical weak zero-knowledge because the simulator can nd a generator with probability 1 ? log ?c n in time polynomial in log c n, as shown in Appendix B.
The proof system presented above can be extended to work for many other cyclic groups with known order. In particular, when working with the multiplicative group modulo q, a power of an odd prime p, all that is necessary is to substitute '(q) = p n?1 (p ? 1) It is easy to see that, since the simulator chooses x randomly, s?xs 0 (modp?1) is a random multiple at of t, the order of g. Now the simulator will repeat the above procedure until it succeeds in getting another random multiple a 0 t or until it has run the procedure 2 k times, in which case it will nd t by brute force. We know from 24] that Pr gcd(at; a 0 t) = t] = 6= 2 . Hence, it can be shown, by techniques similar to those in Appendix A, that this simulator runs in expected polynomial time: 2 If the modulus has more than one prime factor or is a large power ( 3) of two, no elements would be generators. One could, however, still ask the question: Does the subgroup generated by the element g have fewer than m elements (for a prime modulus m can be p ? 1)? Then if the prover knows t such that g t 1 (mod n), and s = bm=tc is su ciently large, one could give a zero-knowledge proof that g only generates a small subgroup.
3.4 Does n have a square factor?
Recall that in section 3.1 (Corollary 1) we constructed a protocol for proving that an element is a generator for Z p , where p is a prime and p ?1 is square-free. When p ?1 is not squarefree, that protocol shows that an element is a quasi-generator, though it may not be a generator. It is possible, however, to use this de ciency in the proof system for primitivity to show that p ? 1 is not square-free.
First, if 4 j p ? 1, p ? 1 clearly has a square factor and this is easily seen by the veri er, so we can assume that 46 jp ? 1. Therefore if p ? 1 is not square-free, then the prover can nd an element h that is a quasi-generator but not a generator. Now she can prove to the veri er that h is a quasi-generator using protocol 2 and that h is not a generator using protocol 5. At this point the veri er is convinced that p ? 1 has a square factor. This idea can be extended to give a general protocol for integers which have a square factor. To show that an integer n has a square factor, the prover rst nds a prime p such that n j p ? 1. Then the prover shows that p ? 1 has a square-factor, which is also a square factor of n.
The set we are concerned with is S = fnj n = q 2 m; q primeg
The integer n is available to both the prover and the veri er; the complete factorization of n is initially on the prover's private auxiliary input tape; and the prover is attempting to convince the veri er that n has a nontrivial square factor, q 2 , where q is prime.
Protocol 7
1. The veri er accepts if 4 j n.
2. The prover nds a prime p < n 3 such that p = an + 1. He sends p and the complete factorization of a to the veri er. 3. The veri er accepts if s 2 j n for some prime factor s of a. 4 . The prover nds a generator g in Z p and sends h = g q to the veri er. 5. The prover proves that h is a quasi-generator, using Protocol 2. 6. The prover proves that h is not a generator, using Protocol 5. We have from 28] that '(n) C(n= loglog n); hence if x = n 3 the above is greater than C 0 log log n log n + O(n ? 1 2 log n):
Note that x = n 2+ is su cient if > 0. To nd p, one can use Bach's method 3] to produce an appropriate a randomly, along with the complete factorization of a.
Another way to nd an appropriate p is by trying n + 1; 2n + 1; 3n + 1; : : : until we nd a prime. Wagsta 31] has given an heuristic argument which says that we would usually only have to try up to O(log
